Exploring the Linkage between Corruption and Economic Development in Case of Selected Developing and Developed Nations

Corruption is like an epidemic that has the power to destroy a country’s socio-economic, financial, human and political environment. It has severe consequences in developing countries. This study has examined the impact of existing human, political, financial and economic factors on corruption for a set of panel countries. The data from 1995 to 2004 is used to serve this purpose. For examining the stationarity of the variables, Levin- Lin-Chu (2002), Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests are applied. Pedroni Residual based Co-integration and FMOLS by Phillips and Hansen (1990) test has been used for examining the co-integration among the variables of the model. The speed of adjustment and short-run relationship has been tested through VECM. The estimated results show that exports, GDP per capita and political stability have a negative impact on corruption whereas imports, financial development, human development index, bureaucracy, democracy and rule of law have a positive relationship with corruption. The simplified procedures of import and export will help in reducing the practice of bribes and corruption. The governments should take necessary steps not only to increase the income but also to improve the people ’s standard of living. There should be improvements in the political system. Democracy is also helpful to get rid of corruption.


I. Introduction
Corruption has developed into a global issue triggered by many structural and institutional factors such as the nature of the political system, the sociocultural background, the low salaries, the low risk of detection and the punishment (Lu, 2000;Quah 2002). In the simplest form, corruption can be defined as the use of power for personal benefits such as stealing public funds, bribes for procurement of public services and sale of public assets by government officers without proper procedures. An act of corruption can be characterized by the value of the transaction concerned.
Although this is a continuous variable, the analytical distinction usually made is between a low value ("petty") and a large value ("grand") corruption. Typically, the larger the value of the corrupt transaction, the higher the position in the public hierarchy of the public official(s) involved [Goel and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (1999), Svensson (2005)]. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) highlight the different forms and capacities of corruption. Corruption exists in all types of societies irrespective of different socio-economic and cultural history. It occurs everywhere even though amount/size varies from a person or a nation to another. Mostly, the developing countries that are subject to a low level of transparency and accountability, defective judicial and legislative system, faulty organizational structure and rent seeking movements are trapped in the clutches of corruption. Moreover, it exacts many economic and social costs, and distorts the composition of government spending at the expense of health and education sectors. It also steers resource allocation towards unproductive direction. Further, it discourages the entry of FDI, and thus harms the economic growth (Tanzi 2002, De Vaal andEbben, 2011). Corruption can be considered as the oil that greases the economic growth engine (Anoruo and Braha, 2005), however it is broadly perceived that the disadvantages of corruption are far outweighed compared to its advantages.
Economic growth is a process that influences the economic well-being of a community. Corruption implements a major threat to economic growth: the public and private sector efficiency is reduced when it enables people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. The current literature lacks of theoretical underpinning that incorporates the potential effects of corruption on aggregate output through its impact on the arguments of the production function (Kaufman 1998;Shleifer 1998;Ackerman 1999;Vittal 1999;Chafuen 2000;Mo 2001;Alesina and Angeletos 2002). Foreign flows are frequently connected with hefty and lucrative projects or often with denationalization of companies that are good prospects of rent extraction due to a large amount of rent involved and the investor can transfer the cost burden towards customers. Hines (1995) proves that US investors differ from others in preferring to locate their FDI in less corrupt countries after 1977. Undemocratic countries are more prone to corruption (LaPalombara, 1994) as public resources are weakly supervised and officers are interested in using them to appeal foreign investment. Countries enjoying a longer period of democracy along with free media, unrestricted electoral process, voice freedom, and more importantly political opposition are the key elements to deter corruption. Open societies do not only import goods but they also import their customs, standards and knowledge (Treisman, 2000 andSandholtz andGray 2003).
Corruption is a prevalent irrespective of development, every country has to face a specific level of corruption. This study is going to answer a few questions. What are the main factors that determine corruption in the case of developed and developing countries? How does the development process more or less plays a role in spreading malfunctioned activities whether on systemic or individual basis? Despite the increasing economic growth, why is a large segment of the population deprived of the basic facilities of life like education and health, in developing countries, and how are the resources in these countries bound in the hands of a tiny portion of the population? Is this a corruption phenomenon?

II. Literature Review
In existing literature of economics, corruption is globally considered to be growth inhibitive. The existing studies consider it a complex phenomenon because its consequences are more deep-seated problems of distortion, institutional incentives and governance. There is a number of studies that highlight the causes and consequences of corruption and the most reverent are taken here as literature review. Huntington (1968) mentions that corruption aids the economy, particularly in the case of cumbersome regulation, excessive bureaucracy, market restriction or inefficient policies.
The resulting waiting costs would be effectively reduced if the payment of speed money could induce bureaucrats to increase their efforts. Ironically, however, corrupt officials might, instead of speeding up, actually cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. Lui (1985) demonstrates the efficiency enhancing the role of corruption via a queuing model and concludes that the size of the economic agents' bribe reflects their opportunity cost, thereby allowing "better" firms to purchase less red tape. Ades and Tella (1999) elaborate that strategies for making more competitive markets affect corruption. The low level of rivalry is translated into more rents extracted by a large number of bureaucrats from companies they regulated. There is more corruption in countries enjoying more economic rent, where local companies are protected from external competition or with restrictive trade and where the number of companies is minor. Opportunities for corruption can be squeezed if the external rivalry exists. Indeed, it creates a negative relation between the size of the trade and the corruption. When the tax and the tariff barriers reduce imports, inward oriented strategies increase corruption. This is the foreign rivalry consequences. Limit the trade and financial streams generate ample chances for the private managers and officers to indulge in corrupt attempts where bribes and payoffs can be offered to get beneficial treatments. This is called "direct policy impact". Bonaglia et al., (2001) argue that openness to trade restrain corruption. The mechanism includes trade policy, foreign rivalry, foreign investors and variations in cost-benefit relationship that is confronted by a country when constructing high-quality organizations to combat corruption. Trade relaxation and financial streams can alter the cost-benefit relationship in corruption. Goel and Korhonen (2011) have discussed the relationship between exports and corruption by using disaggregated statistics of exports covering a large number of countries. It is statistically analyzed that trade of fuel constantly impacts the corruption level whereas trade in manufacturing material and iron doesn't. Growing countries along economic freedom and political liberalization and larger state scope have a reduced corruption level. Haque and Kneller (2004) demonstrate that corruption is widespread particularly in developing countries, especially in the venture relating to the public sector as government officers are given the responsibility of securing public assets being used in the production of creative inputs. Because the information is lopsided, between the bureaucracy and government, the bureaucracy may give a misleading report that procure best quality products at high cost, while delivering products with low quality, consuming low cost. This result is the shape of severe impacts on the efficiency of the economy and thus lessening the growth. Corruption reduces the worth of public amenities, necessary for production and increases the government expenditures above the efficient level. You and Khagram, (2005) analyze that people with higher incomes are more inclined toward corrupt activities whereas individuals bearing low income levels are incapable to fight with corruption as they don't have enough resources even they are persuaded to do so. But with the rise in income inequality, people with lower incomes become vulnerable to payoffs in order to have an approach for several state amenities. Uslaner (2006) explains that unequal income distribution is a reason of increasing corruption and resultantly increased corruption enhances income disparity. Apergis et al., (2010) prove that rising GDP per capita has an adverse impact on corruption and income disparity. Economic development is the best solution to decrease corruption and income inequality. Eicher et al., (2006) have exhibited the bilateral relationship between corruption and education.
Corruption cut revenues that impedes the process of educational accomplishment. Subsequently, chances of corruption increase as with less education people or voters are unable to recognize corrupt candidates and vote to such as a politician. Blackburn and Sarmah (2007) evaluate the connection of economic growth, corruption and life expectancy. Improved life expectancy is connected with development as life expectancy, economic sovereignty and higher national incomes can possibly discourage corruption. Mocan (2008) argues that corruption is a consequence of impersonal association between bureaucracy and general public in cities. It permits them to use their positions and take more bribes, as more bureaucrats are appointed in cities. Due to a larger population and heavy public funds, they can grab resources easily. Though, it is feasible that corruption can be higher in areas with lesser population because of lower civil competition and more chances of retaining office in spite of any suspicious matter. Gillette (2008) has demonstrated that minor bureaucracy is strongly connected with corruption as compared to major bureaucracy. Because where there are more bureaucrats, it can be found how they exercise their obligations without taking payoffs. So undermanned and incompetent staff can be more suspicion as less is the number of bureaucrats who can demand heavy kickbacks to perform their responsibilities. Reduced number of bureaucratic staff can be a cause of increasing corruption due to its relaxed involvement, rarer substitutes for amenities, or lessened productivity of state authorities. Therefore, though 6 | P a g e bureaucrats are penalized for their rent-seeking behavior, the right way is to raise the number of these reviled officers. Alam (1989) refutes the pro-efficiency argument for corruption by contending that because bribery is illegal, bureaucrats will regulate entry into the bidding process to only those who can trust. Since trust is not a proxy for efficiency, there is no reason to believe that the highest bidder will necessarily be most efficient, although the body of theoretical and empirical research that addresses the problem of corruption is still growing (Klitgaard 1987;Kaufman 1998;Shleifer 1998;Ades and Tella 1999;Vittal 1999;Chafuen 2000;Treisman 2000;Wei 2000  progression. This particular relationship is also named as long-term equilibrium. In this study, the test for long-term relationship is: First residual based Panel Co-integration test is familiarized by Pedroni (1999). Pedroni (1999) uses Engle-Granger (1987) approach to check co-integration.

III. Economic Methodology
Engle-Granger approach is grounded on analysis of residuals that whether they are stationary or not. If variables are I(1) then residuals should I(0) and if variables are I(0) then residual must be (I1). Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004 expands the framework of Engle-Granger to multiple regressions.

V. Results and Discussion
To investigate the impacts of Development ( (2000) approach has been replicated. Co-integration among variables is tested through Pedroni Residual Based Co-integration test (1999,2004). For short run association between Development and Corruption VECM is applied. To review the significance of coefficients FMOLS is applied.  t* shows the t-statistic given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and (χ 2) * shows the Chi-square statistic given by Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP. *, ** and *** are to show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Table 1 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Choi (2001   The table 2 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. Results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-Statistic, Panel ADF-Statistics, Group PP-Statistics, and Group ADF-Statistics) are statistically significant, as p-values of these tests are less than 5% significance level. Although some of the results are more than 10%, yet majority of the result are significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases. Thus, the study found longrun relationship between variables.  GDPpc and IMF push the Corruption by 0.0001 and 0.1691 unit respectively. GDPpc pores a very slight impact on corruption level. As developed countries mostly trade in oil and industrial products are available in abundance there, so a rise in exports drop the corruption and they import agricultural products the most which they cannot grow easily so imports grow up the corruption with slight difference in these countries. The table 4 shows the t-statistics, Coefficient and p-values of ECT (Error Correction Term). As the coefficient is negative and p-value is significant at 1% significance level in case of EXP and IMP, so the study pledges the presence of a short-run association between CPI-EXP and CPI-IMP.
Negative sign of coefficient also shows convergence towards equilibrium. EXP and IMP converges towards CPI at the speed of 2.65% and 2.67% annually. Coefficient of GDPpc has negative sign indicating convergence towards equilibrium at the speed of 0.02% annually. But its p-value is statistically insignificant showing no short-run connection between CPI and GDPpc.  Table 5 shows the t-statistics and p-values are given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level. LLC given significant result at 10% level of significance for CPI but the other two have given an insignificant result due to which the study considers insignificant at level but when both variables are converted into 1 st difference, they become stationary. The order of Integration of both variables is same, means both are I(1), so we can check the co-integration between them.  The table 6 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. Results of five out of seven methods (Panel p-statistic, Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADFstatistics, Group PP-statistics, Group ADF-statistics) are statistically significant. Although two results are more than 10%, yet majority of the results are significance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases, thus the study detected long-run relationship between variables.  indicates long-run coefficient. P-value is statistically significant. As DCP has positive sign so, 1 unit increase in DCP reveals a gain in Corruption index by 0.0714 units. Borrowers of private sector practically use the credit for their own best interest and try to get more credit in any way so that they can earn more and more on it, so more credit often induce more corruption.   Table 9 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level. LLC given significant result at 10% level of significance for CPI but the other two given insignificant result due to which study considers insignificant at level. So, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of Unit

V.II Results of Human Development and Corruption
Root, but when both the variables are converted into 1 st difference, they become stationary. The order of integration of both variables is same, means both are I(1), so we can check the cointegration between them.  The table 10 shows the results of residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. Results of the seven methods are statistically significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no Co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases thus, the study found long-run relationship between variables. indicates long-run coefficient. P-values is statistically significant. As HDI has positive sign, so, one-unit increase in HDI shows an increase in Corruption index by 7.8162 units. When people are more rich and educated, they will be more aware of their fundamental rights, so to get their rights they will indulge in corrupt activities if they are unable to get their works done easily. from CPI at the speed of 0.4% annually and the p-value is also statistically insignificant presenting no short-run dynamics between both variables.

Levin-Lin-Chu (t*)
Fisher-ADF (χ 2 )*  Table 13 shows the t-statistics and p-value given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level. LLC given significant at 10% level of significance for the three variables, but the other two given insignificant results due to which study considers them insignificant at level, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of Unit Root, but when all variables are converted into 1 st difference, they become stationary, as all the p-values are statistically significant at 1% significance level. The order of Integration of all variables is same, means all variables are I(1), so we can check the co-integration among them.  The table 14 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. Results of five out of seven methods (Panel p-statistic, Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADFstatistics, Group PP-statistics, Group ADF-statistics) are statistically significant, as p-values of Panel p-statistic is less than 1% significance level in case of other four tests. Although three methods have given values more than 10%, yet majority of the results are significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases. Thus, the study found long-run relationship among variables.  As the coefficients in all cases are negative and p-values are significant at 1% significance, the study concludes the presence of a short-run relationship between CPI-BUR, CPI-DEMO, CPI-POLSTB and CPI-RLW. Negative sign of coefficients shows convergence towards equilibrium.
BUR converges towards CPI at the speed of 9.88% annually.  DEMO converges towards CPI at the speed of 3.33% annually.
 POLSTAB converges towards CPI at the speed of 3.98%.
 RLW converges towards CPI at the speed of 7.46% annually.
P-value are statistically insignificant presenting short-run dynamics among different combinations of variables.    Table 17 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, as all pvalues are insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10%, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of Unit Root, but when all variables are converted into 1 st difference, they become stationary as all the p-values are statistically significant at 1% significance level. The order of Integration of all variables is same, means all variables are I(1), so we can check the co-integration among them.  The table 18 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( . 2004. Results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-statistic, Panel ADF-Statistic, Group PP-Statistic, and Group ADF-statistic) are statistically significant, as p-values of these tests are less than 1% significance level. Although some of the results are more than 10%, yet majority of the results are significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases, thus, the study found long-run relationship between variables.   The table 20 shows the t-statistics, Coefficient and the p-values of ECT (Error Correction Term).

V.IV Results of Economic Development and Corruption
As the coefficients are negative and p-values are significant at 1% significance level in case of EXP and IMP, so the study assures the presence of a short-run association between CPI-EXP and CPI-IMP. Negative sign of coefficient also shows convergence towards equilibrium.  4.41% annual convergence of EXP towards CPI  4.6% annual convergence of IMP towards CPI Coefficient of GDPpc has negative sign highlighting convergence towards equilibrium at the speed of 0.02% annually but its p-value is statistically insignificant showing no short-run connection among them.  Table 21 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type test by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, as all pvalues are insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10%, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of Unit Root, but all variables are converted into 1 st difference, they become stationary, as all the p-values are statistically significant at 1% significance level. The order of Integration of all variables is same, all variables are I(1), so we can check the co-integration among them.  The table 22 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004, the results of four out of seven methods, (Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADF-statistic, Group PP-statistic and Group ADF-Statistic) are statistically significant, as p-values of first two tests are less than 5% and the other two are less than 1% significance level. Although some results are more than 10%, yet majority of the results are significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases thus, the study found long-run relationship between variables. People of private sector try to pull maximum credit towards them in order to get extra benefits, so more credit usually result in more doubtful activities. Negative sign of coefficient shows the convergence of DCP towards equilibrium. DCP converge (get back) towards CPI at the speed of 4.82% annually as the data include is on annual basis. The p-values is also statistically significant presenting a short-run relationship between both variables.  Table 25 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, as all pvalues are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of Unit Root, but when all variables are taken at 1 st difference, they become stationary, as all the p-values are statistically significant at 1% significance level. The order of integration of all variables is same, means all variables are I(1), so we can check the co-integration between them.  The table 26 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. All the results are statistically significant as the p-values are less than 1% of significance level. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases thus, the study found long-run relationship between variables. As HDI has positive sign, so, one-unit increase in HDI shows an increase in corruption index by 4.9028 units. When people are richer and aware, they spend more to get benefits, if not available easily on legal basis. Negative sign of coefficient indicates convergence of HDI towards equilibrium. HDI converge (get back) towards CPI at the speed of 2.66% annually. Its p-value is also statistically significant at 5% significance level presenting a short-run connection between both variables.    Table 29 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin -Lin-Chu (2001) and Fisher type by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001 Pedroni (1999Pedroni ( , 2004. Results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-statistic, Panel ADF-Statistic, Group PPstatistic, and Group ADF-Statistic) are statistically significant, as p-values are less than 1% significance level in these four tests. Although three methods have given values more than 10%, yet majority of the results are significant. So, it shows the rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration and acceptance of alternative hypothesis of co-integration in both cases thus, the study found long-run relationship among variables.  the study settles the presence of a short-run relationship between CPI-BUR, CPI-DEMO, CPI-POLSTB and CPI-RLW. Negative sign of coefficients shows convergence towards equilibrium.  BUR convergence toward CPI at the speed of 11.07% annually.

V.VII Results of political Development and Corruption
 DEMO converge toward CPI at the speed of 5.8% annually.
 POLSTB converge toward CPI at the speed of 5.65% annually.
 RLW converge towards CPI at the speed of 10.07% annually.
P-values are statistically significant presenting short-run dynamic among different combination of variables.

Conclusions and Policy Suggestions
This study focused on the impacts of Development (Economic, Financial, Human, and Political) on corruption. It examined this relationship by using 20 years' data from sample of two panels of procedures. It will help reduce the practice of bribes to get their matters resolves quickly.
Government should take steps to not only increase the income of people, but also to improve their standard of living in other aspects of life especially in Developing countries. Credit availability to public sector should also be made available on easy terms similar to that of private sector. But the policies and check & balance system in both cases should be strict. Along with improved standards of living, people should be served without discrimination. It can also help reduce the bribes. There should be improvement in the political system. Democracy is helpful to get rid of Corruption but more openness and strictness in democracy can be harmful sometimes, so careful steps should be taken by the Governments.